Motty Perry
Don Patinkin Professor of Economics
The
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CONTACT:
(972) 2-658-3681 (Fax)
EDUCATION: M.A.
Economics, B.A.
Economics,
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POSITIONS:
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1983-84 |
Assistant Professor University of Chicago |
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1984-87 |
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1987-88 |
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1988-89 |
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1988-93 |
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1993-99 |
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1994-95 |
Visiting Professor University of Pennsylvania |
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1997-01 |
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1999- |
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2001-06 |
Visiting Professor University of Chicago |
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2006- |
Professor University of Essex |
SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP:
1999 – Charter Member of the Game Theory Society
2000 –
Fellow
of the
RESEARCH
GRANTS:
1984-1987:
Alon Fellowship for excelling young
Israeli scientists
1989-1992: National Science Foundation grant # 8909520
1990-1993: Ford Foundation Fellowship
1996-1998: US-Israel Binational Science Foundation grant # 95-00023
1998-2001:
1999-2002: National Science Foundation grant # LA980011
2001-2004:
2002-2004: National Science Foundation grant # 0001744
2003-2005:
2004-2007: Israel Academy of Science
grant #920/04
2008:
2008:
Yahoo! Faculty Research Grant gift.
EDITORIAL POSITION:
Associate Editor, Journal of Games and Economics Behavior.
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory.
PUBLICATIONS:
1. "Optimal Linear Taxation with Partial Information," 1980. Economic Letters, 15, 257-263.
2. “Non-Linear Price Strategies in a Contestable Market,” 1984. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 32, No. 2, 246-264.
3. “Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle,” 1985 with G. Solon. Journal of Labor, Vol. 3, No. 4, 421-433.
4. “An Example of Price Formation in a Bilateral Situation,” 1986. Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 2, 312-322.
5. “Search in a Known Pattern,” 1986 with A. Wigderson. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No.1, 225-230.
6. “Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information,” 1986 with S. Grossman. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, No.1, 97-119.
7. “Perfect Sequential Equilibrium,” 1986 with S. Grossman. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, No.1, 120-154.
8.a “Strategic Delay in Bargaining,” 1987 with A. Admati. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 54, 345-363.
8.b “Strategic Delay in Bargaining,” 1992 with A. Admati. In Linhart Radner and Satterthwaite (eds.) Bargaining with Incomplete Information, Academic Press, 321-340..
9. “Joint Project without Commitment,” 1991 with A. Admati. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, 259-276.
10. “Non Cooperative Bargaining Without Procedures,” 1993 with P. Reny. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 59 No. 1, 50-77.
11. “Open Vs. Closed Door Negotiation,” 1994 with L. Samuelson. The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, No.2, 348-359.
12.a “A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core,” 1994 with P. Reny. Econometrica, Vol. 62, No.4, 795-818.
12.b “A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core,” 1997 with P. Reny. In E. Maskin (ed), Recent Developments in Game Theory.
13. “Virtual Implementation in Backward Induction,” 1996 with J. Glazer. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 15, No.1, 27-32.
14. “A General Solution to King Solomon Dilemma,” 1999 with P. Reny. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 26, No. 2, 279-285.
15. “The Absent-Minded Driver,” 1997 with R. J. Aumann, and S. Hart. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 1, 102-116.
16. “The Forgetful Passenger,” 1997 with R. J. Aumann, and S. Hart. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 1, 117-120.
17. “On the Failure of the Linkage Principle,” 1999 with P. Reny Econometrica, Vol. 67, No.4, 895-90.
18. “A Sealed Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction,"
2000 with E. wolfstetter and
19. “Dynamic Consistency and Optimal Patent Allocation,” 2002 with D. Vincent. International Economic Review.
20. “An Efficient Auction,” 2002 with Phil Reny. Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 3 – May, 2002, 1199-1212.
21. “An Ex-Post Efficient Ascending Auction,” 2005 with P. Reny. The Review of Economic Studies, 72, 567-592.
22. "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium," with P. Reny. Econometrica, Vol. 74, 1231-1269.
23. "Tournaments with Midterm Reviews" with A. Gershkov, forthcoming, "Games and Economic Behavior"
WORKING PAPERS:
“Efficient Mechanism Design," with V. Krishana.
"Why sex and Why Only in Pairs" with P. Reny and A. Robson.