I am a tenure-track faculty member at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. I received my Ph.D. in 2017 from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem under the guidance of Prof. David Genesove. Later, I spent a year as a post-doctoral researcher at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

My research focuses on industrial organization with a particular interest on antitrust, regulation, and health-care. More specifically, I study the strategic behavior of firms under collusion or under changes in the regulatory environment. The main aim of my research agenda is to shed light on the nature of the strategic actions firms may undertake either to achieve collusive outcomes or to comply with regulation. My work has been published in leading IO and marketing journals, such as RAND and Marketing Science. Some of my new projects have attracted competitive funding by national science agencies (National Science Foundation, Israel Science Foundation, US-Israel Binational Science Foundation) by a total sum of roughly US $800,000.

In a first line of work, which comprises published papers and ongoing work, I empirically study firms' strategies when they collude or when they try to collude. Among other contributions, my papers are among the first ones to undertake an empirical analysis of collusion in non-price/quantity strategic variables. An example of this line of work is the paper "Trade Associations and Collusion among Many Agents: Evidence from Physicians," published in 2020 in the RAND Journal of Economics. In this paper, Juan Pablo Atal (assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania) and I studied a recent case of collaboration where most gynecologists in the city of Chillán formed a trade association to bargain for better rates with Isapres. After unsuccessful negotiations, the physicians jointly terminated their insurer contracts and set a minimum price. We find that subsequently realized prices coincided with Nash-Bertrand prices and that the minimum price was barely binding. We show that these actions ensured the association's stability and increased profits. Moreover, we show that the profit-relevant variable the physicians colluded on was the provider-insurer network. Our findings shed light on the role of trade associations in facilitating collusion among many heterogeneous agents and provide insights for the antitrust analysis of these associations.

In the working paper "Colluding against Environmental Regulation," joint work with Cuicui Chen (assistant professor at SUNY at Albany), Jing Li (assistant professor at MIT Sloan), and Mathias Reynaert (assistant professor at Toulouse School of Economics), we study collusion among firms under imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. We develop a model in which firms increase variable profits by shading pollution and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by shading jointly. We apply our model to a case with three German automakers that colluded to reduce the size of diesel exhaust fluid (DEF) tanks, an emission control technology used to comply with air pollution standards. To estimate our model, we use data from the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018. We find that jointly choosing small DEF tanks lowers the expected noncompliance penalties by at least 188–976 million euros. Smaller DEF tanks improve buyer and producer surplus by freeing up valuable trunk space and saving production costs, but they create more pollution damages. Collusion reduces social welfare by 0.78–4.44 billion euros. Environmental policy design and antitrust play complementary roles in protecting society from collusion against regulation.

In my second line of work, I study firms' responses to regulation. One example of this line of work is the paper "Beyond Consumer Switching: Supply Responses to Food Packaging and Advertising Regulations," forthcoming in Marketing Science. In this paper, joint with Sarah Moshary (assistant professor at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) we analyze the effect of nutrition warning labels and advertising restrictions on the breakfast cereal market in Chile. In June 2016, the Ministry of Health required food products that exceed thresholds for sugar (22.5g) and calories (350kcal) to carry conspicuous front-of-package warning labels. Further, the regulation barred these products from advertising on TV programs with high child viewership. Early evidence suggests that this regulation induces consumers to switch to products without warning labels, and we show that this change in demand elicits a supply response. In particular, we present evidence of bunching just below the cutoffs. Using a structural model of cereal demand, we find that reformulation tends to reinforce the intent of the reform by lowering the calorie content of cereal purchases.